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DD/A 75-4599

19 SEP 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology

ATTENTION : Director of Research and Development

VIA : Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Computer Assisted Polygraph

1 OCT 1975

1. This memorandum is written to advise you of the Office of Security's position regarding two aspects of the Computer Assisted Polygraph (CAP) issue: Whether or not to install some form of CAP, and whether to declassify the techniques and data involved in the CAP study which was conducted by [REDACTED]

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INSTALLATION OF A CAP SYSTEM

2. Our Office recommends against installation of such a system. The possible benefits do not appear to justify the costs of installation, maintenance, and updating or modifying any CAP system that we can presently visualize as evolving from [REDACTED] existing system. Its operational use seems unlikely for the foreseeable future, its use for research and training seems marginal, and any changes in polygraph instrumentation or procedures would probably require significant revisions of a CAP system to achieve compatibility.

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DECLASSIFICATION

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3. In principle, we favor freeing [REDACTED] to use the experience they gained during the CAP studies to as great a degree as is possible without jeopardy to CIA's security interests. In greater detail:

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4. Technology: It is our understanding that the basic technology involved in the study is not classified, although the contract with [REDACTED] specifies that the "reports" are. We feel that to avoid confusion, [REDACTED] should be told that they are free to discuss the technology but that the reports they have prepared for CIA should in themselves continue to be regarded as classified.

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5. CIA Sponsorship: While this is a somewhat complex and sensitive point, we feel on balance that it should be declassified, but that [REDACTED] should be requested not to advertise the relationship. Potential problems are the publicity itself; possible exposure of three CIA staff employees who are under cover but known to [REDACTED] employees as having been involved in the project; and the possible burden of Freedom of Information inquiries regarding the program. Favorable considerations are:

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a. Publicity could be more favorable than unfavorable in its impact, indicating that CIA is serious about improving its research program and scientific in its approach; and that it feels an obligation to the public to make its technological advances available whenever there is no compelling reason to do otherwise. It should be noted that LEAA is currently funding a study which [REDACTED] CAP experience could possibly expedite.

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b. A public statement prepared for the 5 June 1974 congressional hearings in effect exposed the essence of the CAP study.

c. The program was completely legal, proper and productive, and in its general aspects seems to contain nothing the revelation of which would conflict with the sources and methods responsibility of the DCI.

d. Regarding FOI inquiries, a "reasonable guess" inquiry could quite easily occur and result in an equivalent problem even if we do not declassify.

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e. [REDACTED] can be informed that the names of CIA employees known to them must remain classified. If this is done, the risk of cover compromise would seem minimal.

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6. Agreement Study Data: It is possible that the only way [REDACTED] can express the accuracy of the CAP system is in terms of agreement with examiner judgments. Since the system used in making these measurements was quite complicated, the only way the significance of such figures can be understood is by comparison with inter-examiner agreement figures measured by the same rules. Standing opposed to this is the fact that we would prefer not to publish CIA internal performance data. We feel [REDACTED] should be free to describe how

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the agreement studies were conducted and to state that the CAP's performance on large masses of data was closely comparable to that of averaged or grouped examiner performance. However, [REDACTED] should be prohibited from citing exact agreement or stress-detection figures exemplifying CIA performance.

7. Total Number of Cases Involved in Training and Validating the CAP System: It would be useful to [REDACTED] to be able to refer to this and we see no reason to prohibit it.

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8. Rates of and Reasons for Security Disapprovals: [REDACTED] probably has no data of this type in its possession. However, to avoid confusion, we feel they should be informed that any information related to this topic is to be regarded as classified.

9. IBM Cards or Other CIA-generated Data Used for Training and Validating the CAP: These materials should be returned to CIA for destruction.

10. Please do not hesitate to call my office should you have any questions or comments concerning the above. With reference to the declassification of CAP technology, we would welcome an opportunity to meet with representatives of your office to discuss the procedures involved.

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[REDACTED]
Acting Director of Security

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